

## Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: OPTION III: SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS WITHIN A COMBINED  
AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING

REF: A) USNATO 4009 DTG 301705Z JULY 75; B) USNATO 4068  
DTG 011800Z AUG 75

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE REVISED TEXT OF THE WORKING GROUP STUDY  
ON SUB-CEILINGS BASED ON THE CONSIDERATION OF AN EARLIER  
DRAFT (REFTELS) AT THE AUGUST 12 WG SESSION.

2. THE UK MOD REP (GERAHTY) BELIEVED THAT THE WG SHOULD NOT  
CONSIDER THE NEED FOR A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE ONLY FROM THE  
POINT OF VIEW OF WHAT NATO COULD ALLOW TO THE WP. HE FELT  
THAT IT WOULD BE MORE POSITIVE TO FIRST STATE THE RANGE OF  
FLEXIBILITY LIKELY TO BE REQUIRED BY NATO AND THEN DETERMINE  
IF THIS FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE WOULD STILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE  
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SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE AGAINST EASTERN CIRCUMVENTION OF THE  
FOCUS ON THE REDUCTION OF GROUND MANPOWER. HE OFFERED A  
RE-DRAFT OF THE PERTINENT PARAS OF THE DRAFT WHICH HE THOUGHT  
WOULD IMPROVE THE PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE STUDY (SEE

PARAS 11-18 BELOW).

3. GERAHTY ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE EXTRA VERIFICATION PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN PREVENTING CIRCUMVENTION OF SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS SHOULD BE MENTIONED AND HE OFFERED A DRAFT ON THIS SUBJECT (SEE PARAS 19 AND 20 BELOW).

4. THE WG WILL MEET AGAIN AUGUST 21 TO ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE A FINAL DRAFT OF THIS STUDY BEFORE THE SPC RETURNS TO WORK AUGUST 25.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR AUGUST 21 WG SESSION.

6. BEGIN TEXT:

#### INTRODUCTION

1. IN PREVIOUS REPORTS(1) ON STUDIES CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAVE EXAMINED THE MILITARY/TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING WITHOUT ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS. IN ONE OF THOSE STUDIES(2) THE WORKING GROUP FOUND THAT TWO APPROACHES STUDIED (BOTH INVOLVING NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS, EITHER ON BOTH GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER, OR ON GROUND MANPOWER ALONE) WOULD BE HOLLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE DECLARED ALLIED OBJECTIVES(3) IN MBFR. TWO OTHER APPROACHES EXAMINED (INVOLVING RESPECTIVELY NO SUB-CEILINGS AND A SUB-CEILING ON AIR MANPOWER ONLY ) WERE ALSO EXAMINED. THE WORKING GROUP FOUND THAT THESE LATTER APPROACHES MIGHT NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ALLIED FOCUS, SINCE TECHNICALLY THEY WOULD NOT PRECLUDE REINSTATEMENT OF GROUND FORCES REDUCTIONS AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR, UNLESS SOME TYPE MEASURE (I.E. NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE) CAN BE DEvised TO COMPLEMENT THESE APPROACHES.

2. LATER PROPOSALS(4), WERE MADE FOR STUDY OF THE DESIRABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF ARRANGING CEILINGS OR SUB-CEILINGS  
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IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALLOW SOME LIMITED FREEDOM, FOR NATO, POST-MBFR, TO TRANSFER MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND THUS RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE THE FORCES.

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(1) AC/276-D(74)12 AND 14

(2) AC/276-D(74)14

(3) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

(4) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/74-154 OF 2 DEC 74 AND USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-2 OF 16 JAN 75

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3. THE WORKING GROUP SEEK, IN THIS RESPECT, TO COMPLETE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THEIR STUDY OF THE MILITARY/ TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISSUES RAISED AT PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING, WHERE APPROPRIATE, SOME TYPE MEASURES (I.E. NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE) TO COMPLEMENT APPROACHES INVOLVING NO SUB-CEILING ON GROUND MANPOWER, THE VIDE PARA 1 ABOVE. SCOPE OF THE REPORT

4. THE REPORT SETS OUT, AS BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT STUDY, THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR. IT THEN DISCUSSES THE LEVEL OF FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO HANDLE TRANSFERS BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER POST-MBFR. IT ADDRESSES THE IMPLICATIONS, IN CONTEXT, OF POSSIBLE REDEFINITION OF FORCES, AND FINALLY EXAMINES SOME POSSIBLE CEILING AND SUB-CEILING APPROACHES.

ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR

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5. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR, TAKEN INTO FULL CONSIDERATION IN PREVIOUS WORKING GROUP STUDIES OF THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR AND OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUB-CEILINGS, REMAIN ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. THESE OBJECTIVES REQUIRE, INTER ALIA, THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT, AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON

COLLECTIVE CEILING, APPROPRIATELY DEFINED IN PHASE 1, ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE 2. THESE OBJECTIVES ALSO REQUIRE THE SOVIET UNION IN PHASE 1 TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS INCLUDING SOME 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS: FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW IN PHASE 1 29,000 US SOLDIERS. PROPOSALS FOR INCLUSION OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN PHASE 1 OF MBFR, CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE ALLIANCE, REAFFIRM THOSE OBJECTIVES. IN DRAWING UP ITS TABLED REDUCTION PROPOSALS (C-M(73)83) AS OUTLINED ABOVE, NATO CALCULATED THAT IN ORDER TO REACH A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF ABOUT 700,000 MEN, THE WP (USING 1973 NATO DATA) WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCE STRENGTH IN THE AREA NOT ONLY BY ONE TANK ARMY OF 68,000 MEN IN PHASE 1 BUT BY 157,000 MEN IN PHASE 2. IT WAS HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT WP REDUCTIONS OF SUCH PROPORTIONS IN PHASE 2 WOULD BE CERTAIN TO ENSURE THE INCLUSION OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF WP FIGHTING UNITS, TO PRODUCE A SITUATION POST-PHASE WN WHEN THE CURRENT 2.5:1 RATIO IN "M" DAY COMBAT DIVISIONS IN FAVOUR OF THE WP WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR THIS REQUIREMENT IN MIND WHEN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO THE NATO PROPOSALS.

6. FURTHER PROPOSALS, FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WITHOUT REQUIRED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, ARE ALSO CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE ALLIANCE. THOSE PROPOSALS, IF ADOPTED, WOULD BE DESIGNED TO FURTHER, NOT TO MODIFY, THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.

7. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THOSE ALLIED OBJECTIVES, THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEVERAL APPROACHES TO DEFINING AND IMPLEMENTING A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING. THESE APPROACHES EMBRACE, ON THE OTHER, SECRET

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RIGIDLY DEFINED NUMERICAL COLLECTIVE CEILINGS FOR GROUND AND FOR AIR PERSONNEL. TOTAL FREEDOM TO MIX(1), IF UNCONSTRAINED, WOULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO INCREASE GROUND MANPOWER AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR AND VICE VERSA: THE WARSAW PACT COULD, IF NOT CONSTRAINED, REPLACE THE GROUND MANPOWER REDUCED, BY REDUCING THEIR AIR MANPOWER. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO CURRENTLY STATED ALLIED OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS AS SUMMARISED ABOVE.

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(1) THIS TOTAL FREEDOM IN PRACTICE WOULD BE CONSTRAINED FOR BOTH SIDES, BY THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THEIR AIR FORCES AT A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO MEET COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING AIR DEFENCE AND SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES. IT WOULD ALSO BE CONSTRAINED BY THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN GROUND FORCES AT A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE COMMITMENTS OF THOSE FORCES.  
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8. RIGID NUMERICAL COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND PERSONNEL FOR BOTH SIDES WOULD MAINTAIN THE ALLIED MBFR OBJECTIVES, AS DEFINED ABOVE. THIS WOULD ALLOW TRANSFER FROM GROUND TO AIR, BUT NOT VICE VERSA. APPLICATION OF RIGID NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS ON BOTH GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL WOULD INHIBIT TRANSFERS IN EITHER DIRECTION.

9. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH RIGIDITY ARE DIFFICULT TO FORECAST. KNOWN NATIONAL PLANS, WHICH SPECIFY ANY REQUIREMENT TO INCREASE GROUND PERSONNEL AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR OR VICE VERSA. HOWEVER, FOR THE LONGER TERM, SUCH RESTRUCTURING SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT. IT CAN BE ENVISAGED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IMPROVEMENT AND TECHNICAL ADVANCES (ALREADY KNOWN) OF SSM LAUNCHING SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS COULD ENTAIL SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN GROUND AND AIR TASKING AND CONSEQUENT TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE TWO ELEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, RATIONALISATION COULD SIMILARLY INVOLVE INCREASE OF ONE SERVICE AND THE REDUCTION OF THE OTHER.

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10. WHILE IT IS APPRECIATED THAT PROVISION FOR RENEGOTIATION OR REVIEW AFTER A FIXED PERIOD WILL PROBABLY BE INCLUDED IN ANY MBFR AGREEMENT, ADOPTION OF RIGID NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD INHIBIT THE POSSIBLE TRANSFERS ENVISAGED AND COULD BE DIFFICULT TO RENEGOTIATE. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE PROUDENT:

A. TO IDENTIFY, AND QUANTIFY TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE DEGREE

FO FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD ALLIED INTERESTS.

B. TO EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS MEANS OF PERMITTING LIMITED FREEDOM TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL, POST-MBFR, WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS DERIVING FROM A. ABOVE.

DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED

11. THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY ALLOWED FOR TRANSFER OF MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES SHOULD BE BASED AT A LEVEL WHICH WOULD  
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ENSURE A REASONABLE ALLOWANCE FOR POSSIBLE ALLIED RESTRUCTURING AND YET WOULD MAINTAIN THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE. THESE REQUIREMENTS CANNOT WHOLLY BE COMPATIBLE SINCE ANY TRANSFER OF WP MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FROM GROUND TO AIR FORCES WOULD BE LIKELY TO RESULT IN THE REINTRODUCTION INTO THE NGA OF ADDITIONAL WP COMBAT UNITS TO REPLACE SOME OF THOSE WITHDRAWN OR DISBANDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THUS THE FIRST ESSENTIAL IS TO DECIDE THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE (IF ANY) WHICH WOULD BE NEGOTIATED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATO'S OWN FORCES IN THE 1980'S.

12. A PREVIOUS WORKING GROUP PAPER (AC/276-D(75)5, PARAGRAPHS 43-45) DISCUSSED SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN SETTING A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR THE TRANSFER OF MANPOWER FROM GROUND TO AIR FORCE, OR VICE VERSA, AT 20,000 MEN (OR AT TWO AND ONE QUARTER PERCENT OF THE POST-MBFR GROUND FORCE CEILING OF 700,000 MEN)

THE WORKING GROUP SELECTED THE FIGURE OF 20,000 ON THE BASIS OF CONSIDERED MILITARY JUDGEMENT THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY MEET CURRENT AND FUTURE ALLIED RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, ENSURE THAT THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA IS MAINTAINED, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE NUMBER OF MEN WHICH THE WARSAW PACT COULD TRANSFER FROM AIR TO GROUND FORCES WOULD BE MILITARILY TOLERABLE TO THE ALLIANCE. SUCH A FIGURE, IF APPLIED ON A PRO RATA BASIS AMONG NATO NATIONS WITH FORCES IN THE NGA, COULD RESULT, FOR EXAMPLE IN AN FRG SHARE OF ABOUT 10,000 MEN OR A NL SHARE OF ABOUT 2,000 MEN. WHETHER SUCH FIGURES WOULD MEET NATO NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE FUTURE IT IS IMPRACTICABLE TO SAY WITH ANY CERTAINTY, BUT THEY COULD WELL BE ON THE SMALL SIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ALL NATIONS WOULD WANT TO RESTRUCTURE IN THE SAME DIRECTION (FOR EXAMPLE, FROM GROUND TO AIR) AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, PROVIDED THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE OF 20,000 WAS BUILT-IN TO AN AGREEMENT AS A COLLECTIVE ALLIED (OR WP) ALLOWANCE, ALLIED REQUIREMENTS TO RESTRUCTURE IN ONE WAY COULD BE COMPENSATED FOR BY OTHER ALLIED REQUIREMENTS TO RESTRUCTURE IN THE OPPOSITE WAY. IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT SUCH FLEXIBILITY TO TRANSFER MANPOWER FROM ONE SERVICE TO ANOTHER WOULD BE UNNECESSARY, SINCE THE SAME RESULT COULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS (E.G. IF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY RESULTS IN A

## REQUIREMENT FOR FEWER CLOSE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT AND MORE LONG RANGE

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ARTILLERY, A TRANSFER OF MANPOWER COULD BE MADE FROM AIR TO GROUND FOR THIS PURPOSE, IF COMPENSATED BY A TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS IN ANOTHER FIELD (E.G. LOGISTICS) FROM GROUND TO AIR). SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN THEORY, BUT MIGHT NOT PRODUCE THE BEST MILITARY ANSWER. MILITARY JUDGEMENT SUGGESTS, THEREFORE, THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR NATO TO RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO TRANSFER ABOUT 20,000 AIR MANPOWER POSTS TO GROUND FORCE POSTS, OR VICE VERSA, POST-MBFR.

13. THE PENALTY FOR ARRANGING SUCH FLEXIBILITY FOR NATO WOULD BE TO GIVE SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY TO THE WP. THIS WOULD ENABLE, FOR EXAMPLE THE WP TO TRANSFER THE MANPOWER EXQUVALENT OF A SOVIET MOTOR RIFLE DIVISIONAL SLICE OF MANPOWER FROM AIR FORCES TO GROUND FORCES. WHETHER THEY WOULD WISH TO EXPLOIT THIS FREEDOM, EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF A MAJOR TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION BECOMING AVAILABLE, IS DEBATABLE, SINCE 20,000 MEN REPRESENT ABOUT 10 PCT OF THE TOTAL WP AIR MANPOWER IN THE NGA ACCORDING TO NATO'S ASSESSMENT AND REDUCTIONS ON THAT SCALE COULD DECREASE THE WP AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY. IT SHOULD ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT UNDER ANY FLEXIBILITY ARRANGEMENT, IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE FOR THE WP TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR MANPOWER AND NATO TO DECREASE ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR. THUS, IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO INCREASE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN WP AND NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, POST-MBFR, BY TWICE THE AGREED FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FIGURE.

14. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, THE WORKING GROUP JUDGE THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGES FOR NATO TO NEGOTIATE A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE ON THE ORDER OF 20,000 MEN.

## REDEFINITION OF FORCES

15. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE WP PROPOSALS FOR DEFINING FORCES BY FUNCTIONS RATHER THAN UNITOFM ARE SET OUT IN SITCEN 3001 (WHICH IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING UPDATED). THE EFFECTS, WHICH THESE WP PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE ON THE SEFVICE SUB-CEILING ISSUE, ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

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STRENGTHS IN THOUSANDS			
	NATO	WP	REMARKS
SERIAL	SITUATION	GROUND AIR TOTAL	GROUND AIR TOTAL
1	AS AT 1 JAN 75	791 193	937 208

2 AFTER RE-  
DEFINITION 797 187 913 232 REDUCTION  
BASE LINE  
3 POST-MBFR- 717 187 904 672 232 904 NO EXPLICIT  
SIT A AIR OR GROUND  
D  
CEILING  
4 POST-MBFR- 717 232 949 717 232 949 EXPLICIT  
SIT B GROUND AND  
AIR SUB-  
CEILINGS.  
VERY HIGH  
OVERALL AIR  
/  
GROUND COM-  
BINED CEIL-  
ING.  
5 POST-MBFR- 717 187 904 717 232 949 EXPLICIT  
SIT C GROUND SUB-  
CEILINGS ON  
LY  
NO OVERALL  
AIR/GROUND  
COMBINED  
COMMON  
CEILING.

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16. IF IS APPARENT FROM THE ABOVE THAT:

A. IF IT IS DECIDED THAT AIR MANPOWER, WITHOUT AIR REDUCTIONS, IS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN OVERALL AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING SET AT ABOUT 900,000 (SERIAL 3 ABOVE) THERE CAN BE NO EXPLICIT COMMON AIR OR GROUND SUB-CEILINGS.

B. IF AIR MANPOWER, WITHOUT AIR REDUCTIONS, IS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN OVERALL AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING AND A COMMON GROUND FORCE CEILING OF 717,000 IS TO BE ACHIEVED, THEN THE OVERALL CEILING AIR/GROUND CEILING WILL HAVE TO BE SET AT ABOUT 950,000 (SEE SERIAL 4 ABOVE). SUCH AN OVERALL CEILING WOULD ALLOW NATO AIR FORCES THE OPTION OF INCREASING BY 45,000 MEN (OR OVER 20 PCT). THIS OPTION MIGHT THEREFORE BE UNNEGOTIABLE.

C. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO SERIALS 3 OR 4 ABOVE, IN WHICH AN EXPLICIT NUMERIC GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING WAS ATTAINABLE, WOULD INVOLVE THE ABANDONMENT OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER, WITHOUT AIR  
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REDUCTIONS, IN AN OVERALL AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING (SERIAL 5). THIS OPTION IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER AND IS NOT, THEREFORE, DISCUSSED OTHER THAN TO POINT OUT THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN THE AIR MANPOWER STRENGTH OF THE TWO SIDES TO BE CONTRACTUALISED.

17. IT FOLLOWS, THEREFORE, THAT IF THE ALLIANCE WERE TO DECIDE ON A REDEFINITION OF FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WP PROPOSALS, THE ONLY OPTION LIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE WOULD BE ONE WHICH INVOLVED NO EXPLICIT COMMON NUMERIC SUB-CEILING ON GROUND OR AIR FORCE MANPOWER. IT SHOULD BE TECHNICALLY PRACTICABLE, IF THAT OPTION WERE ADOPTED, TO DEVISE AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED BOTH SIDES SOME FLEXIBILITY TO VARY THE IMPLICIT NUMERIC SUB-CEILING ON GROUND FORCES THAT ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT WILL BRING, SHOULD SUCH FLEXIBILITY BE CONSIDERED DESIRABLE.

18. IT IS EMPHASISED THAT THE ABOVE COMMENTS ASSUME WP ACCEPTANCE OF NATO DATA ASSESSMENTS OF BOTH SIDES FIGURES. SUCH WP ACCEPTANCE IS UNLIKELY AND USE OF WP DATA COULD MAKE THE FIGURES SET OUT IN THE TABLE AT PARAGRAPH 15 EVEN UNFAVOURABLE TO NATO.

VERIFICATION

19. A FACTOR WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THE SERVICE SUB-CEILING ISSUE IS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CAPABILITY OF NATO TO MONITOR AN MBFR AGREEMENT ONCE REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED. FAILING THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUFFICIENT MOBILE TEAMS OF BOTH SIDES IN THE NGA, WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO BE POSSIBLE, NATO'S CAPABILITY TO MONITOR RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS WILL BE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL MEANS. IT IS SOLUTARY, THEREFORE, TO RECALL THE CONTENTS OF PAGES

8 TO 10 OF ANNEX E TO "THE US APPROACH TO MBFR" DATED 30 APRIL, 1973 WHICH SETS OUT THE CURRENT US MONITORING CAPABILITY. IN SUMMARY THE US PAPER SAYS:

A. THEY "WOULD HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE OF DETECTING A 10 PCT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF WP DIVISIONS IN THE NGA WITHIN ABOUT 90 DAYS".

B. "UP TO A YEAR MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO DETECT (BUT NOT NECESSARILY MEASURE) AN AUGMENTATION OF SOVIET UNITS THROUGH AN INCREASE OF SECRET

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THE ORDER OF 20 PCT IN MANPOWER OR EQUIPMENT - SOME 80,000 MEN OR 1,800 TANKS - IF THE INCREASE WERE MADE COVERTLY OVER TIME. SMALLER INCREASES, CARRIED OUT COVERTLY, MIGHT NEVER BE DETECTED."

C. IF THE WP INITIATED A RAPID, MAJOR BUILD-UP AGAINST NATO FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION, THEY WOULD DETECT IT WITHIN A WEEK AND POSSIBLY IN A DAY OR SO.

20. IT FOLLOWS THAT COVERT WP MAJOR (E.G. 10 PCT) CIRCUMVENTION OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH INVOLVED MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COULD GO UNDETECTED BY NATO FOR A PERIOD OF A YEAR OR MORE. SMALLER AMOUNTS OF THE ORDER OF THE 20,000 MEN MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE FLEXIBILITY ISSUE MAY NOT BE DETECTED.

POSSIBLE CEILING ARRANGEMENTS, WITHIN A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, ALLOWING LIMITED FREEDOM TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR.

21. IN AN ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS ON GROUND OR AIR FORCES (ONLY ON THE AGGREGATE OF THE TWO) IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WP FORCES TO RESTRUCTURE THE GROUND/AIR MIX IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CHANGE AND POSSIBLY THREATEN THE BALANCE IN THE AREA. ANY INCREASE IN GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER, WITHIN THE OVERALL CONSTRAINT IMPOSED BY THE COMBINED CEILING, WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER SERVICE. IN A POST-REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT SUB-CEILINGS OR OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WP UNDER A COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING, TO REINSTATE ITS GROUND FORCE LEVELS, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE BY CORRESPONDINGLY REDUCING AIR MANPOWER. FIXED SUB-CEILINGS COULD CONSTRAIN SUCH AN ACTION, AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT OF THE ALLIANCE VERIFICATION CAPABILITY, BUT WOULD NECESSARILY BE RECIPROCAL, THUS CONSTRAINING NATO'S ABILITY TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL AND RESTRUCTURE FORCES. GIVEN THESE COUNTERVAILING NEEDS, THERE ARE ESSENTIALLY THREE APPROACHES WHICH COULD BOTH CONSTRAIN THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE WP COULD DEVIATE FROM POST-REDUCTION LEVELS AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY FOR RESTRUCTURING; THESE ARE:

A. NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS (I.E. NOT DEFINED NUMERICALLY).

B. EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS, SUBJECT TO A PRESCRIBED VARIATION  
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WITHIN A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE.

C. OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILINGS.

NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS.

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22. THE USSUE OF SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS WITHIN A COLLECTIVE  
GROUND-AIR COMMON CEILING NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED IN A FORM  
WHICH WOULD PRESCRIBE EXPLICIT, NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS. THE  
CEILINGS WOULD RESULT (DE FACTO) FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED  
REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO CONSTRAIN  
SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATIONS FROM THOSE RESIDUAL LEVELS, TO INCLUDE A  
CLAUSE IN THE MBFR AGREEMENT RESTRAINING BOTH SIDES FROM  
RESTRUCTURING GROUND OR AIR FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO  
SIGNIFICANTLY DEPART FROM THE SERVICE MANPOWER RELATIONSHIPS  
(RATIO) EXISTING AFTER THE REDUCTIONS, OR TO CIRCUMVENT THE  
NATURE OF THE REDUCTIONS.

23. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILING  
APPROACH AS A CONSTRAINT TO RESTRUCTURING OF WP FORCES WOULD  
ONLY BE AS EFFECTIVE AS ALLIED VERIFICATION MEANS. TO THE

EXTENT THAT REDUCTIONS IN UNITS IN MORE VERIFIABLE THAN  
REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER, THE NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILING APPROACH  
WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN CONSTRAINING RESTRUCTURING  
SECRET

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WERE REDUCTIONS ARE TAKEN IN UNITS RATHER THAN MANPOWER.

24. THE NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILING COUPLED WITH A NON-  
CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE AS ENVISAGED ABOVE MIGHT PROVIDE THE  
EAST WITH OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO TRIVIAL ALLIED FORCE CHARGES.

25. THE REMAINING APPROACHES EXAMINED EACH INVOLVE THE  
PLACEMENT OF A NUMERIC LEVEL ON SUB-CEILINGS.

EXPLICIT NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS

26. EXPLICIT NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS WOULD INVOLVE PLACING  
A FIXED, SPECIFIC NUMBER FOR AGGREGATE GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER  
OR BOTH, WITHIN AN EQUALLY SPECIFIC NUMBER FOR THE AGGREGATE  
OF THE TWO. FLEXIBILITY COULD BE ACHIEVED BY DEFINING EITHER A  
NUMBER OR PERSONNEL OR A PERCENTAGE OF ONE OR MORE OF THE CEILINGS,  
WITHIN WHICH THE FORCES OF EITHER SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO TRANSFER  
BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR.

27. THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE, IF HONOURED. IT  
WOULD PROVIDE THE REQUIRED LEGAL CONSTRAINT OF THE ABILITY OF  
THE WARSAW PACT TO TRANSFER MEN FROM AIR TO GROUND FORCES.  
IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO THE  
ALLIES TO RETAIN FREEDOM FOR RESTRUCTURING ON A LIMITED SCALE.

28. THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD HOWEVER, DEFINE THE DEGREE  
OF FLEXIBILITY IN MANPOWER ALONE. VERIFICATION OF THE PRECISE  
NUMBER OF MEN TRANSFERRED BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR WOULD BE  
IMPRACTICABLE EXCEPT BY AN UNACCEPTABILITY INTRUSIVE INSPECTION  
SYSTEM: AND IN ANY CASE COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED.

OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILINGS

29. UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, THERE WOULD BE SPECIFIED  
MAXIMUM FORCE STRENGTHS FOR BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES. HOWEVER,  
THE COMBINED TOTAL OF BOTH GROUND AND AIR WOULD EXCEED THE  
OVERALL COMMON CEILING. THUS, EITHER SERVICE COULD BE INCREASED,  
AT THE COST OF DECREASING THE OTHER, BUT ONLY WITHIN SPECIFIED  
AMOUNTS.

30. THE EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT IN  
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MILITARY/TECHNICAL TERMS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE DISCUSSED  
FOR THE IMPLICIT NUMERIC SUB-CEILINGS WITH A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE,

AT PARAGRAPHS 26 TO 29 ABOVE.

FINDINGS

31. THE WORKING GROUP FIND THAT:

A. A SCALE OF FREEDOM TO TRANSFER MANPOWER ON THE ORDER OF 20,000 MEN SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT ANY REQUIRED RESTRUCTURING WITHIN A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND/AIR PERSONNEL.

B. ASSUMING ALLIED NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED (SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRIC GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS BY THE WP LEADING TO APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND INVOLVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE 1), IT WOULD BE MILITARILY TOLERABLE TO ALLOW THE WP FREEDON TO TRANSFER UP TO 20,000 MEN BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES.

C. THE TOLERABLE UPPER LIMIT OF FREEDOM TO TRANSFER WOULD REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION IF, AFTER REDUCTIONS, THERE REMAINED A SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND MANPOWER LEVELS.

D. MEANS CAN BE FOUND WHICH WOULD TECHNICALLY PERMIT TRANSFERS OF PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES, WITHIN DEFINED LIMITS. VERIFICATION OF ADHERENCE TO THESE LIMITS COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED.  
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